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https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2021-06-01 CVE-2020-14305 CVE-2020-14381 CVE-2021-0512 CVE-2021-3347 * tag 'ASB-2021-06-05_4.19-stable' of https://github.com/aosp-mirror/kernel_common: Linux 4.19.193 usb: core: reduce power-on-good delay time of root hub net: hns3: check the return of skb_checksum_help() drivers/net/ethernet: clean up unused assignments hugetlbfs: hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash() cleanup MIPS: ralink: export rt_sysc_membase for rt2880_wdt.c MIPS: alchemy: xxs1500: add gpio-au1000.h header file sch_dsmark: fix a NULL deref in qdisc_reset() ipv6: record frag_max_size in atomic fragments in input path scsi: libsas: Use _safe() loop in sas_resume_port() ixgbe: fix large MTU request from VF bpf: Set mac_len in bpf_skb_change_head ASoC: cs35l33: fix an error code in probe() staging: emxx_udc: fix loop in _nbu2ss_nuke() mld: fix panic in mld_newpack() net: bnx2: Fix error return code in bnx2_init_board() openvswitch: meter: fix race when getting now_ms. net: mdio: octeon: Fix some double free issues net: mdio: thunder: Fix a double free issue in the .remove function net: fec: fix the potential memory leak in fec_enet_init() net: dsa: fix error code getting shifted with 4 in dsa_slave_get_sset_count net: netcp: Fix an error message drm/amdgpu: Fix a use-after-free drm/amd/amdgpu: fix refcount leak drm/amd/display: Disconnect non-DP with no EDID SMB3: incorrect file id in requests compounded with open platform/x86: intel_punit_ipc: Append MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE for ACPI platform/x86: hp-wireless: add AMD's hardware id to the supported list btrfs: do not BUG_ON in link_to_fixup_dir openrisc: Define memory barrier mb scsi: BusLogic: Fix 64-bit system enumeration error for Buslogic media: gspca: properly check for errors in po1030_probe() media: dvb: Add check on sp8870_readreg return ASoC: cs43130: handle errors in cs43130_probe() properly libertas: register sysfs groups properly dmaengine: qcom_hidma: comment platform_driver_register call isdn: mISDNinfineon: check/cleanup ioremap failure correctly in setup_io char: hpet: add checks after calling ioremap net: caif: remove BUG_ON(dev == NULL) in caif_xmit net: fujitsu: fix potential null-ptr-deref serial: max310x: unregister uart driver in case of failure and abort platform/x86: hp_accel: Avoid invoking _INI to speed up resume perf jevents: Fix getting maximum number of fds i2c: i801: Don't generate an interrupt on bus reset i2c: s3c2410: fix possible NULL pointer deref on read message after write net: dsa: fix a crash if ->get_sset_count() fails net: dsa: mt7530: fix VLAN traffic leaks tipc: skb_linearize the head skb when reassembling msgs Revert "net:tipc: Fix a double free in tipc_sk_mcast_rcv" net/mlx4: Fix EEPROM dump support drm/meson: fix shutdown crash when component not probed NFSv4: Fix v4.0/v4.1 SEEK_DATA return -ENOTSUPP when set NFS_V4_2 config NFS: Don't corrupt the value of pg_bytes_written in nfs_do_recoalesce() NFS: fix an incorrect limit in filelayout_decode_layout() Bluetooth: cmtp: fix file refcount when cmtp_attach_device fails spi: mt7621: Don't leak SPI master in probe error path spi: mt7621: Disable clock in probe error path spi: gpio: Don't leak SPI master in probe error path bpf: No need to simulate speculative domain for immediates bpf: Fix mask direction swap upon off reg sign change bpf: Wrap aux data inside bpf_sanitize_info container bpf: Fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation bpf: Update selftests to reflect new error states bpf: Tighten speculative pointer arithmetic mask bpf: Move sanitize_val_alu out of op switch bpf: Refactor and streamline bounds check into helper bpf: Improve verifier error messages for users bpf: Rework ptr_limit into alu_limit and add common error path bpf: Ensure off_reg has no mixed signed bounds for all types bpf: Move off_reg into sanitize_ptr_alu bpf, test_verifier: switch bpf_get_stack's 0 s> r8 test bpf: Test_verifier, bpf_get_stack return value add <0 bpf: extend is_branch_taken to registers selftests/bpf: add selftest part of "bpf: improve verifier branch analysis" selftests/bpf: Test narrow loads with off > 0 in test_verifier bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged bpf: fix up selftests after backports were fixed net: usb: fix memory leak in smsc75xx_bind usb: gadget: udc: renesas_usb3: Fix a race in usb3_start_pipen() usb: dwc3: gadget: Properly track pending and queued SG USB: serial: pl2303: add device id for ADLINK ND-6530 GC USB: serial: ftdi_sio: add IDs for IDS GmbH Products USB: serial: option: add Telit LE910-S1 compositions 0x7010, 0x7011 USB: serial: ti_usb_3410_5052: add startech.com device id serial: rp2: use 'request_firmware' instead of 'request_firmware_nowait' serial: sh-sci: Fix off-by-one error in FIFO threshold register setting USB: usbfs: Don't WARN about excessively large memory allocations USB: trancevibrator: fix control-request direction iio: adc: ad7793: Add missing error code in ad7793_setup() staging: iio: cdc: ad7746: avoid overwrite of num_channels mei: request autosuspend after sending rx flow control thunderbolt: dma_port: Fix NVM read buffer bounds and offset issue misc/uss720: fix memory leak in uss720_probe kgdb: fix gcc-11 warnings harder dm snapshot: properly fix a crash when an origin has no snapshots ath10k: Validate first subframe of A-MSDU before processing the list mac80211: extend protection against mixed key and fragment cache attacks mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames mac80211: prevent attacks on TKIP/WEP as well mac80211: check defrag PN against current frame mac80211: add fragment cache to sta_info mac80211: drop A-MSDUs on old ciphers cfg80211: mitigate A-MSDU aggregation attacks mac80211: properly handle A-MSDUs that start with an RFC 1042 header mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacks mac80211: assure all fragments are encrypted net: hso: fix control-request directions proc: Check /proc/$pid/attr/ writes against file opener perf intel-pt: Fix transaction abort handling perf intel-pt: Fix sample instruction bytes iommu/vt-d: Fix sysfs leak in alloc_iommu() NFSv4: Fix a NULL pointer dereference in pnfs_mark_matching_lsegs_return() cifs: set server->cipher_type to AES-128-CCM for SMB3.0 NFC: nci: fix memory leak in nci_allocate_device usb: dwc3: gadget: Enable suspend events mm, vmstat: drop zone->lock in /proc/pagetypeinfo Revert "spi: Fix use-after-free with devm_spi_alloc_*" Revert "modules: inherit TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE" Linux 4.19.192 Bluetooth: SMP: Fail if remote and local public keys are identical video: hgafb: correctly handle card detect failure during probe tty: vt: always invoke vc->vc_sw->con_resize callback vt: Fix character height handling with VT_RESIZEX vgacon: Record video mode changes with VT_RESIZEX video: hgafb: fix potential NULL pointer dereference qlcnic: Add null check after calling netdev_alloc_skb leds: lp5523: check return value of lp5xx_read and jump to cleanup code net: rtlwifi: properly check for alloc_workqueue() failure scsi: ufs: handle cleanup correctly on devm_reset_control_get error net: stmicro: handle clk_prepare() failure during init ethernet: sun: niu: fix missing checks of niu_pci_eeprom_read() Revert "niu: fix missing checks of niu_pci_eeprom_read" Revert "qlcnic: Avoid potential NULL pointer dereference" Revert "rtlwifi: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference" Revert "media: rcar_drif: fix a memory disclosure" cdrom: gdrom: initialize global variable at init time cdrom: gdrom: deallocate struct gdrom_unit fields in remove_gdrom Revert "gdrom: fix a memory leak bug" Revert "scsi: ufs: fix a missing check of devm_reset_control_get" Revert "ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code" Revert "video: imsttfb: fix potential NULL pointer dereferences" Revert "hwmon: (lm80) fix a missing check of bus read in lm80 probe" Revert "leds: lp5523: fix a missing check of return value of lp55xx_read" Revert "net: stmicro: fix a missing check of clk_prepare" Revert "video: hgafb: fix potential NULL pointer dereference" dm snapshot: fix crash with transient storage and zero chunk size xen-pciback: reconfigure also from backend watch handler Revert "serial: mvebu-uart: Fix to avoid a potential NULL pointer dereference" rapidio: handle create_workqueue() failure Revert "rapidio: fix a NULL pointer dereference when create_workqueue() fails" ALSA: hda/realtek: Add some CLOVE SSIDs of ALC293 ALSA: hda/realtek: reset eapd coeff to default value for alc287 Revert "ALSA: sb8: add a check for request_region" ALSA: bebob/oxfw: fix Kconfig entry for Mackie d.2 Pro ALSA: usb-audio: Validate MS endpoint descriptors ALSA: dice: fix stream format at middle sampling rate for Alesis iO 26 ALSA: line6: Fix racy initialization of LINE6 MIDI ALSA: dice: fix stream format for TC Electronic Konnekt Live at high sampling transfer frequency cifs: fix memory leak in smb2_copychunk_range locking/mutex: clear MUTEX_FLAGS if wait_list is empty due to signal nvmet: seset ns->file when open fails ptrace: make ptrace() fail if the tracee changed its pid unexpectedly platform/x86: dell-smbios-wmi: Fix oops on rmmod dell_smbios RDMA/mlx5: Recover from fatal event in dual port mode scsi: qla2xxx: Fix error return code in qla82xx_write_flash_dword() RDMA/rxe: Clear all QP fields if creation failed openrisc: Fix a memory leak firmware: arm_scpi: Prevent the ternary sign expansion bug Linux 4.19.191 scripts: switch explicitly to Python 3 tweewide: Fix most Shebang lines KVM: arm64: Initialize VCPU mdcr_el2 before loading it iomap: fix sub-page uptodate handling ipv6: remove extra dev_hold() for fallback tunnels ip6_tunnel: sit: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods sit: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods ip6_gre: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods net: stmmac: Do not enable RX FIFO overflow interrupts lib: stackdepot: turn depot_lock spinlock to raw_spinlock block: reexpand iov_iter after read/write ALSA: hda: generic: change the DAC ctl name for LO+SPK or LO+HP gpiolib: acpi: Add quirk to ignore EC wakeups on Dell Venue 10 Pro 5055 scsi: target: tcmu: Return from tcmu_handle_completions() if cmd_id not found ceph: fix fscache invalidation riscv: Workaround mcount name prior to clang-13 scripts/recordmcount.pl: Fix RISC-V regex for clang ARM: 9075/1: kernel: Fix interrupted SMC calls um: Mark all kernel symbols as local Input: silead - add workaround for x86 BIOS-es which bring the chip up in a stuck state Input: elants_i2c - do not bind to i2c-hid compatible ACPI instantiated devices ACPI / hotplug / PCI: Fix reference count leak in enable_slot() ARM: 9066/1: ftrace: pause/unpause function graph tracer in cpu_suspend() PCI: thunder: Fix compile testing xsk: Simplify detection of empty and full rings pinctrl: ingenic: Improve unreachable code generation isdn: capi: fix mismatched prototypes cxgb4: Fix the -Wmisleading-indentation warning usb: sl811-hcd: improve misleading indentation kgdb: fix gcc-11 warning on indentation x86/msr: Fix wr/rdmsr_safe_regs_on_cpu() prototypes nvme: do not try to reconfigure APST when the controller is not live clk: exynos7: Mark aclk_fsys1_200 as critical netfilter: conntrack: Make global sysctls readonly in non-init netns kobject_uevent: remove warning in init_uevent_argv() thermal/core/fair share: Lock the thermal zone while looping over instances MIPS: Avoid handcoded DIVU in `__div64_32' altogether MIPS: Avoid DIVU in `__div64_32' is result would be zero MIPS: Reinstate platform `__div64_32' handler FDDI: defxx: Make MMIO the configuration default except for EISA KVM: x86: Cancel pvclock_gtod_work on module removal cdc-wdm: untangle a circular dependency between callback and softint iio: tsl2583: Fix division by a zero lux_val iio: gyro: mpu3050: Fix reported temperature value xhci: Add reset resume quirk for AMD xhci controller. xhci: Do not use GFP_KERNEL in (potentially) atomic context usb: dwc3: gadget: Return success always for kick transfer in ep queue usb: core: hub: fix race condition about TRSMRCY of resume usb: dwc2: Fix gadget DMA unmap direction usb: xhci: Increase timeout for HC halt usb: dwc3: pci: Enable usb2-gadget-lpm-disable for Intel Merrifield usb: dwc3: omap: improve extcon initialization blk-mq: Swap two calls in blk_mq_exit_queue() ACPI: scan: Fix a memory leak in an error handling path usb: fotg210-hcd: Fix an error message iio: proximity: pulsedlight: Fix rumtime PM imbalance on error drm/radeon/dpm: Disable sclk switching on Oland when two 4K 60Hz monitors are connected userfaultfd: release page in error path to avoid BUG_ON squashfs: fix divide error in calculate_skip() hfsplus: prevent corruption in shrinking truncate powerpc/64s: Fix crashes when toggling entry flush barrier powerpc/64s: Fix crashes when toggling stf barrier ARC: entry: fix off-by-one error in syscall number validation i40e: Fix use-after-free in i40e_client_subtask() netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets() kernel: kexec_file: fix error return code of kexec_calculate_store_digests() sched/fair: Fix unfairness caused by missing load decay netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: Fix a missing skb_header_pointer() NULL check smc: disallow TCP_ULP in smc_setsockopt() net: fix nla_strcmp to handle more then one trailing null character ksm: fix potential missing rmap_item for stable_node mm/hugeltb: handle the error case in hugetlb_fix_reserve_counts() khugepaged: fix wrong result value for trace_mm_collapse_huge_page_isolate() drm/radeon: Avoid power table parsing memory leaks drm/radeon: Fix off-by-one power_state index heap overwrite netfilter: xt_SECMARK: add new revision to fix structure layout sctp: fix a SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB leak in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b ethernet:enic: Fix a use after free bug in enic_hard_start_xmit sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a net: hns3: disable phy loopback setting in hclge_mac_start_phy rtc: ds1307: Fix wday settings for rx8130 NFSv4.2 fix handling of sr_eof in SEEK's reply pNFS/flexfiles: fix incorrect size check in decode_nfs_fh() PCI: endpoint: Fix missing destroy_workqueue() NFS: Deal correctly with attribute generation counter overflow NFSv4.2: Always flush out writes in nfs42_proc_fallocate() rpmsg: qcom_glink_native: fix error return code of qcom_glink_rx_data() ARM: 9064/1: hw_breakpoint: Do not directly check the event's overflow_handler hook PCI: Release OF node in pci_scan_device()'s error path PCI: iproc: Fix return value of iproc_msi_irq_domain_alloc() f2fs: fix a redundant call to f2fs_balance_fs if an error occurs ASoC: rt286: Make RT286_SET_GPIO_* readable and writable ia64: module: fix symbolizer crash on fdescr net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix RX VLAN offload powerpc/iommu: Annotate nested lock for lockdep wl3501_cs: Fix out-of-bounds warnings in wl3501_mgmt_join wl3501_cs: Fix out-of-bounds warnings in wl3501_send_pkt powerpc/pseries: Stop calling printk in rtas_stop_self() samples/bpf: Fix broken tracex1 due to kprobe argument change ethtool: ioctl: Fix out-of-bounds warning in store_link_ksettings_for_user() ASoC: rt286: Generalize support for ALC3263 codec powerpc/smp: Set numa node before updating mask sctp: Fix out-of-bounds warning in sctp_process_asconf_param() kconfig: nconf: stop endless search loops selftests: Set CC to clang in lib.mk if LLVM is set cuse: prevent clone pinctrl: samsung: use 'int' for register masks in Exynos mac80211: clear the beacon's CRC after channel switch i2c: Add I2C_AQ_NO_REP_START adapter quirk ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Add quirk for the Chuwi Hi8 tablet ip6_vti: proper dev_{hold|put} in ndo_[un]init methods Bluetooth: check for zapped sk before connecting net: bridge: when suppression is enabled exclude RARP packets Bluetooth: initialize skb_queue_head at l2cap_chan_create() Bluetooth: Set CONF_NOT_COMPLETE as l2cap_chan default ALSA: rme9652: don't disable if not enabled ALSA: hdspm: don't disable if not enabled ALSA: hdsp: don't disable if not enabled i2c: bail out early when RDWR parameters are wrong net: stmmac: Set FIFO sizes for ipq806x ASoC: Intel: bytcr_rt5640: Enable jack-detect support on Asus T100TAF tipc: convert dest node's address to network order fs: dlm: fix debugfs dump tpm: fix error return code in tpm2_get_cc_attrs_tbl() Revert "fdt: Properly handle "no-map" field in the memory region" Revert "of/fdt: Make sure no-map does not remove already reserved regions" sctp: delay auto_asconf init until binding the first addr Revert "net/sctp: fix race condition in sctp_destroy_sock" smp: Fix smp_call_function_single_async prototype net: Only allow init netns to set default tcp cong to a restricted algo mm/memory-failure: unnecessary amount of unmapping mm/sparse: add the missing sparse_buffer_fini() in error branch kfifo: fix ternary sign extension bugs net:nfc:digital: Fix a double free in digital_tg_recv_dep_req RDMA/bnxt_re: Fix a double free in bnxt_qplib_alloc_res net:emac/emac-mac: Fix a use after free in emac_mac_tx_buf_send net: geneve: modify IP header check in geneve6_xmit_skb and geneve_xmit_skb arm64: dts: uniphier: Change phy-mode to RGMII-ID to enable delay pins for RTL8211E ARM: dts: uniphier: Change phy-mode to RGMII-ID to enable delay pins for RTL8211E bnxt_en: fix ternary sign extension bug in bnxt_show_temp() powerpc/52xx: Fix an invalid ASM expression ('addi' used instead of 'add') ath10k: Fix ath10k_wmi_tlv_op_pull_peer_stats_info() unlock without lock ath9k: Fix error check in ath9k_hw_read_revisions() for PCI devices net: davinci_emac: Fix incorrect masking of tx and rx error channel ALSA: usb: midi: don't return -ENOMEM when usb_urb_ep_type_check fails RDMA/i40iw: Fix error unwinding when i40iw_hmc_sd_one fails vsock/vmci: log once the failed queue pair allocation mwl8k: Fix a double Free in mwl8k_probe_hw i2c: sh7760: fix IRQ error path rtlwifi: 8821ae: upgrade PHY and RF parameters powerpc/pseries: extract host bridge from pci_bus prior to bus removal MIPS: pci-legacy: stop using of_pci_range_to_resource drm/i915/gvt: Fix error code in intel_gvt_init_device() ASoC: ak5558: correct reset polarity i2c: sh7760: add IRQ check i2c: jz4780: add IRQ check i2c: emev2: add IRQ check i2c: cadence: add IRQ check RDMA/srpt: Fix error return code in srpt_cm_req_recv() net: thunderx: Fix unintentional sign extension issue IB/hfi1: Fix error return code in parse_platform_config() mt7601u: fix always true expression mac80211: bail out if cipher schemes are invalid powerpc: iommu: fix build when neither PCI or IBMVIO is set powerpc/perf: Fix PMU constraint check for EBB events powerpc/64s: Fix pte update for kernel memory on radix liquidio: Fix unintented sign extension of a left shift of a u16 ALSA: usb-audio: Add error checks for usb_driver_claim_interface() calls net: hns3: Limiting the scope of vector_ring_chain variable nfc: pn533: prevent potential memory corruption bug: Remove redundant condition check in report_bug ALSA: core: remove redundant spin_lock pair in snd_card_disconnect powerpc: Fix HAVE_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR_ARCH build configuration powerpc/prom: Mark identical_pvr_fixup as __init net: lapbether: Prevent racing when checking whether the netif is running perf symbols: Fix dso__fprintf_symbols_by_name() to return the number of printed chars HID: plantronics: Workaround for double volume key presses drivers/block/null_blk/main: Fix a double free in null_init. sched/debug: Fix cgroup_path[] serialization x86/events/amd/iommu: Fix sysfs type mismatch HSI: core: fix resource leaks in hsi_add_client_from_dt() mfd: stm32-timers: Avoid clearing auto reload register scsi: ibmvfc: Fix invalid state machine BUG_ON() scsi: sni_53c710: Add IRQ check scsi: sun3x_esp: Add IRQ check scsi: jazz_esp: Add IRQ check clk: uniphier: Fix potential infinite loop clk: qcom: a53-pll: Add missing MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE vfio/mdev: Do not allow a mdev_type to have a NULL parent pointer nvme: retrigger ANA log update if group descriptor isn't found ata: libahci_platform: fix IRQ check sata_mv: add IRQ checks pata_ipx4xx_cf: fix IRQ check pata_arasan_cf: fix IRQ check x86/kprobes: Fix to check non boostable prefixes correctly drm/amdkfd: fix build error with AMD_IOMMU_V2=m media: m88rs6000t: avoid potential out-of-bounds reads on arrays media: omap4iss: return error code when omap4iss_get() failed media: vivid: fix assignment of dev->fbuf_out_flags soc: aspeed: fix a ternary sign expansion bug ttyprintk: Add TTY hangup callback. usb: dwc2: Fix hibernation between host and device modes. usb: dwc2: Fix host mode hibernation exit with remote wakeup flow. Drivers: hv: vmbus: Increase wait time for VMbus unload x86/platform/uv: Fix !KEXEC build failure platform/x86: pmc_atom: Match all Beckhoff Automation baytrail boards with critclk_systems DMI table usbip: vudc: fix missing unlock on error in usbip_sockfd_store() firmware: qcom-scm: Fix QCOM_SCM configuration tty: fix return value for unsupported ioctls tty: actually undefine superseded ASYNC flags USB: cdc-acm: fix unprivileged TIOCCSERIAL usb: gadget: r8a66597: Add missing null check on return from platform_get_resource cpufreq: armada-37xx: Fix determining base CPU frequency cpufreq: armada-37xx: Fix driver cleanup when registration failed clk: mvebu: armada-37xx-periph: Fix workaround for switching from L1 to L0 clk: mvebu: armada-37xx-periph: Fix switching CPU freq from 250 Mhz to 1 GHz cpufreq: armada-37xx: Fix the AVS value for load L1 clk: mvebu: armada-37xx-periph: remove .set_parent method for CPU PM clock cpufreq: armada-37xx: Fix setting TBG parent for load levels crypto: qat - Fix a double free in adf_create_ring ACPI: CPPC: Replace cppc_attr with kobj_attribute soc: qcom: mdt_loader: Detect truncated read of segments soc: qcom: mdt_loader: Validate that p_filesz < p_memsz spi: Fix use-after-free with devm_spi_alloc_* staging: greybus: uart: fix unprivileged TIOCCSERIAL staging: rtl8192u: Fix potential infinite loop irqchip/gic-v3: Fix OF_BAD_ADDR error handling mtd: rawnand: gpmi: Fix a double free in gpmi_nand_init soundwire: stream: fix memory leak in stream config error path USB: gadget: udc: fix wrong pointer passed to IS_ERR() and PTR_ERR() usb: gadget: aspeed: fix dma map failure crypto: qat - fix error path in adf_isr_resource_alloc() phy: marvell: ARMADA375_USBCLUSTER_PHY should not default to y, unconditionally soundwire: bus: Fix device found flag correctly bus: qcom: Put child node before return mtd: require write permissions for locking and badblock ioctls fotg210-udc: Complete OUT requests on short packets fotg210-udc: Don't DMA more than the buffer can take fotg210-udc: Mask GRP2 interrupts we don't handle fotg210-udc: Remove a dubious condition leading to fotg210_done fotg210-udc: Fix EP0 IN requests bigger than two packets fotg210-udc: Fix DMA on EP0 for length > max packet size crypto: qat - ADF_STATUS_PF_RUNNING should be set after adf_dev_init crypto: qat - don't release uninitialized resources usb: gadget: pch_udc: Check for DMA mapping error usb: gadget: pch_udc: Check if driver is present before calling ->setup() usb: gadget: pch_udc: Replace cpu_to_le32() by lower_32_bits() x86/microcode: Check for offline CPUs before requesting new microcode mtd: rawnand: qcom: Return actual error code instead of -ENODEV mtd: Handle possible -EPROBE_DEFER from parse_mtd_partitions() mtd: rawnand: brcmnand: fix OOB R/W with Hamming ECC mtd: rawnand: fsmc: Fix error code in fsmc_nand_probe() regmap: set debugfs_name to NULL after it is freed usb: typec: tcpci: Check ROLE_CONTROL while interpreting CC_STATUS serial: stm32: fix tx_empty condition serial: stm32: fix incorrect characters on console ARM: dts: exynos: correct PMIC interrupt trigger level on Snow ARM: dts: exynos: correct PMIC interrupt trigger level on SMDK5250 ARM: dts: exynos: correct PMIC interrupt trigger level on Odroid X/U3 family ARM: dts: exynos: correct PMIC interrupt trigger level on Midas family ARM: dts: exynos: correct MUIC interrupt trigger level on Midas family ARM: dts: exynos: correct fuel gauge interrupt trigger level on Midas family memory: gpmc: fix out of bounds read and dereference on gpmc_cs[] usb: gadget: pch_udc: Revertd3cb25a121
completely ovl: fix missing revert_creds() on error path KVM: s390: split kvm_s390_real_to_abs KVM: s390: fix guarded storage control register handling KVM: s390: split kvm_s390_logical_to_effective x86/cpu: Initialize MSR_TSC_AUX if RDTSCP *or* RDPID is supported ALSA: hda/realtek: Remove redundant entry for ALC861 Haier/Uniwill devices ALSA: hda/realtek: Re-order ALC269 Lenovo quirk table entries ALSA: hda/realtek: Re-order ALC269 Sony quirk table entries ALSA: hda/realtek: Re-order ALC269 Dell quirk table entries ALSA: hda/realtek: Re-order ALC269 HP quirk table entries ALSA: hda/realtek: Re-order ALC882 Clevo quirk table entries ALSA: hda/realtek: Re-order ALC882 Sony quirk table entries ALSA: hda/realtek: Re-order ALC882 Acer quirk table entries drm/radeon: fix copy of uninitialized variable back to userspace cfg80211: scan: drop entry from hidden_list on overflow ipw2x00: potential buffer overflow in libipw_wx_set_encodeext() md: Fix missing unused status line of /proc/mdstat md: md_open returns -EBUSY when entering racing area md: factor out a mddev_find_locked helper from mddev_find md: split mddev_find md-cluster: fix use-after-free issue when removing rdev md/bitmap: wait for external bitmap writes to complete during tear down misc: vmw_vmci: explicitly initialize vmci_datagram payload misc: vmw_vmci: explicitly initialize vmci_notify_bm_set_msg struct misc: lis3lv02d: Fix false-positive WARN on various HP models iio:accel:adis16201: Fix wrong axis assignment that prevents loading FDDI: defxx: Bail out gracefully with unassigned PCI resource for CSR MIPS: pci-rt2880: fix slot 0 configuration MIPS: pci-mt7620: fix PLL lock check ASoC: samsung: tm2_wm5110: check of of_parse return value net/nfc: fix use-after-free llcp_sock_bind/connect bluetooth: eliminate the potential race condition when removing the HCI controller hsr: use netdev_err() instead of WARN_ONCE() Bluetooth: verify AMP hci_chan before amp_destroy modules: inherit TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE modules: return licensing information from find_symbol modules: rename the licence field in struct symsearch to license modules: unexport __module_address modules: unexport __module_text_address modules: mark each_symbol_section static modules: mark find_symbol static modules: mark ref_module static dm rq: fix double free of blk_mq_tag_set in dev remove after table load fails dm space map common: fix division bug in sm_ll_find_free_block() dm persistent data: packed struct should have an aligned() attribute too tracing: Restructure trace_clock_global() to never block tracing: Map all PIDs to command lines rsi: Use resume_noirq for SDIO tty: fix memory leak in vc_deallocate usb: dwc2: Fix session request interrupt handler usb: dwc3: gadget: Fix START_TRANSFER link state check usb: gadget/function/f_fs string table fix for multiple languages usb: gadget: Fix double free of device descriptor pointers usb: gadget: dummy_hcd: fix gpf in gadget_setup media: dvbdev: Fix memory leak in dvb_media_device_free() ext4: fix error code in ext4_commit_super ext4: do not set SB_ACTIVE in ext4_orphan_cleanup() ext4: fix check to prevent false positive report of incorrect used inodes arm64: vdso: remove commas between macro name and arguments posix-timers: Preserve return value in clock_adjtime32() Revert337f13046f
("futex: Allow FUTEX_CLOCK_REALTIME with FUTEX_WAIT op") jffs2: check the validity of dstlen in jffs2_zlib_compress() Fix misc new gcc warnings security: commoncap: fix -Wstringop-overread warning dm raid: fix inconclusive reshape layout on fast raid4/5/6 table reload sequences md/raid1: properly indicate failure when ending a failed write request tpm: vtpm_proxy: Avoid reading host log when using a virtual device intel_th: pci: Add Alder Lake-M support powerpc: fix EDEADLOCK redefinition error in uapi/asm/errno.h powerpc/eeh: Fix EEH handling for hugepages in ioremap space. jffs2: Fix kasan slab-out-of-bounds problem NFSv4: Don't discard segments marked for return in _pnfs_return_layout() NFS: Don't discard pNFS layout segments that are marked for return ACPI: GTDT: Don't corrupt interrupt mappings on watchdow probe failure openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packets mlxsw: spectrum_mr: Update egress RIF list before route's action f2fs: fix to avoid out-of-bounds memory access ubifs: Only check replay with inode type to judge if inode linked arm64/vdso: Discard .note.gnu.property sections in vDSO btrfs: fix race when picking most recent mod log operation for an old root ALSA: hda/realtek: Add quirk for Intel Clevo PCx0Dx ALSA: usb-audio: Add dB range mapping for Sennheiser Communications Headset PC 8 ALSA: usb-audio: More constifications ALSA: usb-audio: Explicitly set up the clock selector ALSA: sb: Fix two use after free in snd_sb_qsound_build ALSA: hda/conexant: Re-order CX5066 quirk table entries ALSA: emu8000: Fix a use after free in snd_emu8000_create_mixer s390/archrandom: add parameter check for s390_arch_random_generate scsi: libfc: Fix a format specifier scsi: lpfc: Remove unsupported mbox PORT_CAPABILITIES logic scsi: lpfc: Fix crash when a REG_RPI mailbox fails triggering a LOGO response drm/amdgpu: fix NULL pointer dereference amdgpu: avoid incorrect %hu format string drm/msm/mdp5: Configure PP_SYNC_HEIGHT to double the vtotal media: gscpa/stv06xx: fix memory leak media: dvb-usb: fix memory leak in dvb_usb_adapter_init media: i2c: adv7842: fix possible use-after-free in adv7842_remove() media: i2c: adv7511-v4l2: fix possible use-after-free in adv7511_remove() media: adv7604: fix possible use-after-free in adv76xx_remove() media: tc358743: fix possible use-after-free in tc358743_remove() power: supply: s3c_adc_battery: fix possible use-after-free in s3c_adc_bat_remove() power: supply: generic-adc-battery: fix possible use-after-free in gab_remove() clk: socfpga: arria10: Fix memory leak of socfpga_clk on error return media: vivid: update EDID media: em28xx: fix memory leak scsi: scsi_dh_alua: Remove check for ASC 24h in alua_rtpg() scsi: qla2xxx: Fix use after free in bsg scsi: qla2xxx: Always check the return value of qla24xx_get_isp_stats() drm/amdgpu : Fix asic reset regression issue introduce by 8f211fe8ac7c4f power: supply: Use IRQF_ONESHOT media: gspca/sq905.c: fix uninitialized variable media: media/saa7164: fix saa7164_encoder_register() memory leak bugs extcon: arizona: Fix some issues when HPDET IRQ fires after the jack has been unplugged power: supply: bq27xxx: fix power_avg for newer ICs media: drivers: media: pci: sta2x11: fix Kconfig dependency on GPIOLIB media: ite-cir: check for receive overflow scsi: target: pscsi: Fix warning in pscsi_complete_cmd() scsi: lpfc: Fix pt2pt connection does not recover after LOGO scsi: lpfc: Fix incorrect dbde assignment when building target abts wqe btrfs: convert logic BUG_ON()'s in replace_path to ASSERT()'s phy: phy-twl4030-usb: Fix possible use-after-free in twl4030_usb_remove() intel_th: Consistency and off-by-one fix spi: omap-100k: Fix reference leak to master spi: dln2: Fix reference leak to master xhci: fix potential array out of bounds with several interrupters xhci: check control context is valid before dereferencing it. usb: xhci-mtk: support quirk to disable usb2 lpm perf/arm_pmu_platform: Fix error handling tee: optee: do not check memref size on return from Secure World x86/build: Propagate $(CLANG_FLAGS) to $(REALMODE_FLAGS) PCI: PM: Do not read power state in pci_enable_device_flags() usb: xhci: Fix port minor revision usb: dwc3: gadget: Ignore EP queue requests during bus reset usb: gadget: f_uac1: validate input parameters genirq/matrix: Prevent allocation counter corruption usb: gadget: uvc: add bInterval checking for HS mode crypto: api - check for ERR pointers in crypto_destroy_tfm() staging: wimax/i2400m: fix byte-order issue fbdev: zero-fill colormap in fbcmap.c intel_th: pci: Add Rocket Lake CPU support btrfs: fix metadata extent leak after failure to create subvolume cifs: Return correct error code from smb2_get_enc_key erofs: add unsupported inode i_format check mmc: core: Set read only for SD cards with permanent write protect bit mmc: core: Do a power cycle when the CMD11 fails mmc: block: Issue a cache flush only when it's enabled mmc: block: Update ext_csd.cache_ctrl if it was written mmc: sdhci-pci: Fix initialization of some SD cards for Intel BYT-based controllers scsi: qla2xxx: Fix crash in qla2xxx_mqueuecommand() spi: spi-ti-qspi: Free DMA resources mtd: rawnand: atmel: Update ecc_stats.corrected counter mtd: spinand: core: add missing MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE() ecryptfs: fix kernel panic with null dev_name arm64: dts: mt8173: fix property typo of 'phys' in dsi node arm64: dts: marvell: armada-37xx: add syscon compatible to NB clk node ARM: 9056/1: decompressor: fix BSS size calculation for LLVM ld.lld ftrace: Handle commands when closing set_ftrace_filter file ACPI: custom_method: fix a possible memory leak ACPI: custom_method: fix potential use-after-free issue s390/disassembler: increase ebpf disasm buffer size BACKPORT: arm64: vdso32: drop -no-integrated-as flag ANDROID: GKI: update allowed list for incrementalfs.ko ANDROID: dm-user: Drop additional reference ANDROID: FUSE OWNERS pointing to android-mainline OWNERS UPSTREAM: sched: Fix out-of-bound access in uclamp Linux 4.19.190 ovl: allow upperdir inside lowerdir platform/x86: thinkpad_acpi: Correct thermal sensor allocation USB: Add reset-resume quirk for WD19's Realtek Hub USB: Add LPM quirk for Lenovo ThinkPad USB-C Dock Gen2 Ethernet ALSA: usb-audio: Add MIDI quirk for Vox ToneLab EX iwlwifi: Fix softirq/hardirq disabling in iwl_pcie_gen2_enqueue_hcmd() bpf: Fix masking negation logic upon negative dst register mips: Do not include hi and lo in clobber list for R6 iwlwifi: Fix softirq/hardirq disabling in iwl_pcie_enqueue_hcmd() net: usb: ax88179_178a: initialize local variables before use ACPI: x86: Call acpi_boot_table_init() after acpi_table_upgrade() ACPI: tables: x86: Reserve memory occupied by ACPI tables erofs: fix extended inode could cross boundary BACKPORT: FROMGIT: virt_wifi: Return micros for BSS TSF values Change-Id: I84cac05396bbdf22ad69fbdbdce8480aafb8347b Signed-off-by: UtsavBalar1231 <utsavbalar1231@gmail.com> Conflicts: drivers/mmc/core/core.h drivers/mmc/core/mmc.c drivers/mmc/core/mmc_ops.c drivers/usb/core/hub.c drivers/usb/dwc3/gadget.c
1401 lines
40 KiB
C
1401 lines
40 KiB
C
/* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o.
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*
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* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
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* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
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* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
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* (at your option) any later version.
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*
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*/
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#include <linux/capability.h>
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#include <linux/audit.h>
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#include <linux/module.h>
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#include <linux/init.h>
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#include <linux/kernel.h>
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#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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#include <linux/file.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/pagemap.h>
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#include <linux/swap.h>
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#include <linux/skbuff.h>
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#include <linux/netlink.h>
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#include <linux/ptrace.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/prctl.h>
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#include <linux/securebits.h>
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#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
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#include <linux/binfmts.h>
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#include <linux/personality.h>
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#ifdef CONFIG_ANDROID_PARANOID_NETWORK
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#include <linux/android_aid.h>
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#endif
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/*
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* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
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* !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.
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* However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only
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* the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root
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* bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or
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* to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities
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* support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities.
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*
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* Warn if that happens, once per boot.
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*/
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static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
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{
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static int warned;
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if (!warned) {
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printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and"
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" effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all"
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" capabilities.\n", fname);
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warned = 1;
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}
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}
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/**
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* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
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* @cred: The credentials to use
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* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
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* @cap: The capability to check for
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* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
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*
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* Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
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* its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
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*
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* NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
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* and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics:
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* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
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* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
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*/
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int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
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int cap, unsigned int opts)
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{
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struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
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/* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
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* by examining the target user namespace and all of the target
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* user namespace's parents.
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*/
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for (;;) {
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/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
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if (ns == cred->user_ns)
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return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
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/*
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* If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
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* we're done searching.
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*/
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if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
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return -EPERM;
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/*
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* The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
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* user namespace has all caps.
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*/
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if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
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return 0;
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/*
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* If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
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* it over all children user namespaces as well.
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*/
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ns = ns->parent;
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}
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/* We never get here */
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}
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/**
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* cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
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* @ts: The time to set
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* @tz: The timezone to set
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*
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* Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
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* information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
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*/
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int cap_settime(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
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{
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if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
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return -EPERM;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access
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* another
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* @child: The process to be accessed
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* @mode: The mode of attachment.
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*
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* If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
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* task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
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* If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
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* access is allowed.
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* Else denied.
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*
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* Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
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* granted, -ve if denied.
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*/
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int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
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const kernel_cap_t *caller_caps;
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rcu_read_lock();
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cred = current_cred();
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child_cred = __task_cred(child);
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if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_FSCREDS)
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caller_caps = &cred->cap_effective;
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else
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caller_caps = &cred->cap_permitted;
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if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
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cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, *caller_caps))
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goto out;
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if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
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goto out;
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ret = -EPERM;
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out:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
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* @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
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*
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* If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's
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* capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
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* If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace
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* access is allowed.
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* Else denied.
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*
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* Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
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* process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
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*/
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int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
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rcu_read_lock();
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cred = __task_cred(parent);
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child_cred = current_cred();
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if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
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cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
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goto out;
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if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
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goto out;
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ret = -EPERM;
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out:
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return ret;
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}
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/**
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* cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets
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* @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets
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* @effective: The place to record the effective set
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* @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set
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* @permitted: The place to record the permitted set
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*
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* This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns
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* them to the caller.
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*/
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int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
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kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
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{
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const struct cred *cred;
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/* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */
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rcu_read_lock();
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cred = __task_cred(target);
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*effective = cred->cap_effective;
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*inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
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*permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
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rcu_read_unlock();
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old
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* permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not.
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*/
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static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
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{
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/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
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* capability
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*/
|
|
if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
|
|
CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities
|
|
* @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
|
|
* @old: The current task's current credentials
|
|
* @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
|
|
* @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
|
|
* @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
|
|
*
|
|
* This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current
|
|
* process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new
|
|
* credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_capset(struct cred *new,
|
|
const struct cred *old,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *effective,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
|
|
const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
|
|
{
|
|
if (cap_inh_is_capped() &&
|
|
!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
|
|
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
|
|
old->cap_permitted)))
|
|
/* incapable of using this inheritable set */
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable,
|
|
cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable,
|
|
old->cap_bset)))
|
|
/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */
|
|
if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
/* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */
|
|
if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
new->cap_effective = *effective;
|
|
new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;
|
|
new->cap_permitted = *permitted;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Mask off ambient bits that are no longer both permitted and
|
|
* inheritable.
|
|
*/
|
|
new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,
|
|
cap_intersect(*permitted,
|
|
*inheritable));
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges
|
|
* @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
|
|
*
|
|
* Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV
|
|
* affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should
|
|
* inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv()
|
|
* is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0);
|
|
return error > 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode
|
|
* @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter
|
|
*
|
|
* Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
|
|
{
|
|
int error;
|
|
|
|
error = __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS);
|
|
if (error == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
error = 0;
|
|
return error;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
|
|
{
|
|
struct user_namespace *ns;
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_valid(kroot))
|
|
return false;
|
|
|
|
for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
|
|
if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0)
|
|
return true;
|
|
if (ns == &init_user_ns)
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m)
|
|
{
|
|
return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool is_v2header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
|
|
{
|
|
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
|
|
return false;
|
|
return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool is_v3header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
|
|
{
|
|
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
|
|
return false;
|
|
return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
|
|
* xattr from the inode itself.
|
|
*
|
|
* This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
|
|
* return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
|
|
* by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
|
|
* so that's good.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
|
|
bool alloc)
|
|
{
|
|
int size, ret;
|
|
kuid_t kroot;
|
|
u32 nsmagic, magic;
|
|
uid_t root, mappedroot;
|
|
char *tmpbuf = NULL;
|
|
struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
|
|
struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = NULL;
|
|
struct dentry *dentry;
|
|
struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
|
|
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
|
|
|
|
dentry = d_find_any_alias(inode);
|
|
if (!dentry)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
|
|
ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
|
|
&tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
|
|
dput(dentry);
|
|
|
|
if (ret < 0 || !tmpbuf)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
|
|
cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
|
|
if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) {
|
|
root = 0;
|
|
} else if (is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) {
|
|
nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
|
|
root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
|
|
} else {
|
|
size = -EINVAL;
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
|
|
|
|
/* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
|
|
* this as a nscap. */
|
|
mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
|
|
if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
|
|
size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
|
|
if (alloc) {
|
|
if (!nscap) {
|
|
/* v2 -> v3 conversion */
|
|
nscap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
if (!nscap) {
|
|
size = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
}
|
|
nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
|
|
magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
|
|
if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
|
|
nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
|
|
memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
|
|
nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* use allocated v3 buffer */
|
|
tmpbuf = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
|
|
*buffer = nscap;
|
|
}
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
|
|
size = -EOVERFLOW;
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
|
|
size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
|
|
if (alloc) {
|
|
if (nscap) {
|
|
/* v3 -> v2 conversion */
|
|
cap = kzalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
if (!cap) {
|
|
size = -ENOMEM;
|
|
goto out_free;
|
|
}
|
|
magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
|
|
nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
|
|
if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
|
|
magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
|
|
memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
|
|
cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* use unconverted v2 */
|
|
tmpbuf = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
*buffer = cap;
|
|
}
|
|
out_free:
|
|
kfree(tmpbuf);
|
|
return size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
|
|
struct user_namespace *task_ns)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
|
|
uid_t rootid = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
|
|
rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
|
|
|
|
return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool validheader(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap)
|
|
{
|
|
return is_v2header(size, cap) || is_v3header(size, cap);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* User requested a write of security.capability. If needed, update the
|
|
* xattr to change from v2 to v3, or to fixup the v3 rootid.
|
|
*
|
|
* If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
|
|
uid_t nsrootid;
|
|
const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *ivalue;
|
|
__u32 magic, nsmagic;
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
|
|
struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
|
|
*fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
|
|
kuid_t rootid;
|
|
size_t newsize;
|
|
|
|
if (!*ivalue)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (!validheader(size, cap))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
|
|
if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
|
|
/* user is privileged, just write the v2 */
|
|
return size;
|
|
|
|
rootid = rootid_from_xattr(*ivalue, size, task_ns);
|
|
if (!uid_valid(rootid))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
nsrootid = from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid);
|
|
if (nsrootid == -1)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
newsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
|
|
nscap = kmalloc(newsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
|
|
if (!nscap)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(nsrootid);
|
|
nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
|
|
magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
|
|
if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
|
|
nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
|
|
nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
|
|
memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
|
|
|
|
kvfree(*ivalue);
|
|
*ivalue = nscap;
|
|
return newsize;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
|
|
* to a file.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps,
|
|
struct linux_binprm *bprm,
|
|
bool *effective,
|
|
bool *has_fcap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
|
|
unsigned i;
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
|
|
*effective = true;
|
|
|
|
if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK)
|
|
*has_fcap = true;
|
|
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
|
|
__u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i];
|
|
__u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI)
|
|
* The addition of pA' is handled later.
|
|
*/
|
|
new->cap_permitted.cap[i] =
|
|
(new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) |
|
|
(new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable);
|
|
|
|
if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i])
|
|
/* insufficient to execute correctly */
|
|
ret = -EPERM;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they
|
|
* do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are
|
|
* missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities.
|
|
*/
|
|
return *effective ? ret : 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file.
|
|
*/
|
|
int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps)
|
|
{
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
|
|
__u32 magic_etc;
|
|
unsigned tocopy, i;
|
|
int size;
|
|
struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
|
|
struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
|
|
kuid_t rootkuid;
|
|
struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
|
|
|
|
memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
|
|
|
|
if (!inode)
|
|
return -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
|
|
size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
|
|
XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
|
|
if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
|
|
/* no data, that's ok */
|
|
return -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
if (size < 0)
|
|
return size;
|
|
|
|
if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
|
|
|
|
rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
|
|
switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
|
|
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
|
|
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1;
|
|
break;
|
|
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
|
|
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
|
|
break;
|
|
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
|
|
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
|
|
rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
|
|
* or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
|
|
return -ENODATA;
|
|
|
|
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
|
|
if (i >= tocopy)
|
|
break;
|
|
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
|
|
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
|
|
cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from
|
|
* its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being
|
|
* constructed by execve().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc = 0;
|
|
struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps;
|
|
|
|
cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
|
|
|
|
if (!file_caps_enabled)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This check is redundant with mnt_may_suid() but is kept to make
|
|
* explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its
|
|
* descendants.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
|
|
if (rc < 0) {
|
|
if (rc == -EINVAL)
|
|
printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
|
|
bprm->filename);
|
|
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
|
|
rc = 0;
|
|
goto out;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap);
|
|
if (rc == -EINVAL)
|
|
printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
|
|
__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
|
|
|
|
out:
|
|
if (rc)
|
|
cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted);
|
|
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); }
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
|
|
{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); }
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
|
|
{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); }
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred)
|
|
{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); }
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root
|
|
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
|
|
* @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set?
|
|
* @effective: Do we have effective root privilege?
|
|
* @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace
|
|
*
|
|
* Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by
|
|
* SECURE_NOROOT. If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with
|
|
* set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is
|
|
* updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap,
|
|
bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
|
|
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
|
|
|
|
if (!root_privileged())
|
|
return;
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
|
|
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
|
|
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {
|
|
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
|
|
* executables under compatibility mode, we override the
|
|
* capability sets for the file.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {
|
|
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
|
|
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
|
|
old->cap_inheritable);
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))
|
|
*effective = true;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \
|
|
!cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
|
|
#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
|
|
!cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
|
|
#define __cap_full(field, cred) \
|
|
cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
|
|
{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }
|
|
|
|
static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
|
|
{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set
|
|
*
|
|
* We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true:
|
|
* 1) cap_effective has all caps
|
|
* 2) we became root *OR* are were already root
|
|
* 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT)
|
|
* Since this is just a normal root execing a process.
|
|
*
|
|
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
|
|
* that is interesting information to audit.
|
|
*
|
|
* A number of other conditions require logging:
|
|
* 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps
|
|
* 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps
|
|
* 4) non-setuid root gets ambient
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
|
|
kuid_t root, bool has_fcap)
|
|
{
|
|
bool ret = false;
|
|
|
|
if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&
|
|
!(__cap_full(effective, new) &&
|
|
(__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&
|
|
root_privileged())) ||
|
|
(root_privileged() &&
|
|
__is_suid(root, new) &&
|
|
!__cap_full(effective, new)) ||
|
|
(!__is_setuid(new, old) &&
|
|
((has_fcap &&
|
|
__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||
|
|
__cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))
|
|
|
|
ret = true;
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
|
|
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
|
|
*
|
|
* Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
|
|
* constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered,
|
|
* which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
|
|
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
|
|
bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
kuid_t root_uid;
|
|
|
|
new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient;
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
|
|
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
|
|
|
|
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid);
|
|
|
|
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
|
|
if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
|
|
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
|
|
|
|
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
|
|
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
|
|
*
|
|
* In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
|
|
*/
|
|
is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);
|
|
|
|
if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
|
|
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
|
|
!ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
|
|
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
|
|
if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||
|
|
(bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) {
|
|
new->euid = new->uid;
|
|
new->egid = new->gid;
|
|
}
|
|
new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,
|
|
old->cap_permitted);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;
|
|
new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;
|
|
|
|
/* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */
|
|
if (has_fcap || is_setid)
|
|
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now that we've computed pA', update pP' to give:
|
|
* pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | pA'
|
|
*/
|
|
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Set pE' = (fE ? pP' : pA'). Because pA' is zero if fE is set,
|
|
* this is the same as pE' = (fE ? pP' : 0) | pA'.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (effective)
|
|
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
|
|
else
|
|
new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {
|
|
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
|
|
if (ret < 0)
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
|
|
|
|
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
/* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */
|
|
bprm->cap_elevated = 0;
|
|
if (is_setid ||
|
|
(!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&
|
|
(effective ||
|
|
__cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))
|
|
bprm->cap_elevated = 1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered
|
|
* @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
|
|
* @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
|
|
* @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to
|
|
* @size: The size of value
|
|
* @flags: The replacement flag
|
|
*
|
|
* Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if
|
|
* permission is granted, -ve if denied.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those
|
|
* who aren't privileged to do so.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
|
|
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
|
|
if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
|
|
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For XATTR_NAME_CAPS the check will be done in
|
|
* cap_convert_nscap(), called by setxattr()
|
|
*/
|
|
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed
|
|
* @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered
|
|
* @name: The name of the xattr to be changed
|
|
*
|
|
* Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if
|
|
* permission is granted, -ve if denied.
|
|
*
|
|
* This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who
|
|
* aren't privileged to remove them.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
|
|
{
|
|
struct user_namespace *user_ns = dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
|
|
if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
|
|
sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
|
|
/* security.capability gets namespaced */
|
|
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
|
|
if (!inode)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of
|
|
* a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid.
|
|
*
|
|
* 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of
|
|
* {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are
|
|
* cleared.
|
|
*
|
|
* 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective
|
|
* capabilities of the process are cleared.
|
|
*
|
|
* 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective
|
|
* capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities.
|
|
*
|
|
* fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should
|
|
* never happen.
|
|
*
|
|
* -astor
|
|
*
|
|
* cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
|
|
* A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it
|
|
* calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and
|
|
* effective sets will be retained.
|
|
* Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some
|
|
* of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges!
|
|
* Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital
|
|
* files..
|
|
* Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this.
|
|
*/
|
|
static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
|
|
{
|
|
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
|
|
|
|
if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) ||
|
|
uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) ||
|
|
uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) &&
|
|
(!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
|
|
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&
|
|
!uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) {
|
|
if (!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
|
|
cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
|
|
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Pre-ambient programs expect setresuid to nonroot followed
|
|
* by exec to drop capabilities. We should make sure that
|
|
* this remains the case.
|
|
*/
|
|
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
|
|
}
|
|
if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
|
|
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
|
|
if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
|
|
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call
|
|
* @new: The proposed credentials
|
|
* @old: The current task's current credentials
|
|
* @flags: Indications of what has changed
|
|
*
|
|
* Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are
|
|
* actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
|
|
{
|
|
switch (flags) {
|
|
case LSM_SETID_RE:
|
|
case LSM_SETID_ID:
|
|
case LSM_SETID_RES:
|
|
/* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless
|
|
* otherwise suppressed */
|
|
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP))
|
|
cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case LSM_SETID_FS:
|
|
/* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless
|
|
* otherwise suppressed
|
|
*
|
|
* FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities?
|
|
* if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
|
|
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
|
|
if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
|
|
new->cap_effective =
|
|
cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
|
|
|
|
if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
|
|
new->cap_effective =
|
|
cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
|
|
new->cap_permitted);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and
|
|
* task_setnice, assumes that
|
|
* . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed
|
|
* . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes,
|
|
* then those actions should be allowed
|
|
* This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but
|
|
* yet with increased caps.
|
|
* So we check for increased caps on the target process.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
int is_subset, ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
rcu_read_lock();
|
|
is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted,
|
|
current_cred()->cap_permitted);
|
|
if (!is_subset && !ns_capable(__task_cred(p)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_NICE))
|
|
ret = -EPERM;
|
|
rcu_read_unlock();
|
|
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted
|
|
* @p: The task to affect
|
|
*
|
|
* Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the
|
|
* specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
|
|
{
|
|
return cap_safe_nice(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted
|
|
* @p: The task to affect
|
|
* @ioprio: The I/O priority to set
|
|
*
|
|
* Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified
|
|
* task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
|
|
{
|
|
return cap_safe_nice(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted
|
|
* @p: The task to affect
|
|
* @nice: The nice value to set
|
|
*
|
|
* Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the
|
|
* specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
|
|
{
|
|
return cap_safe_nice(p);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from
|
|
* the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap)
|
|
{
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
|
|
|
if (!ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
if (!cap_valid(cap))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module
|
|
* @option: The process control function requested
|
|
* @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function
|
|
*
|
|
* Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may
|
|
* also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here.
|
|
*
|
|
* Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented
|
|
* here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM
|
|
* modules will consider performing the function.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|
|
unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
|
|
struct cred *new;
|
|
|
|
switch (option) {
|
|
case PR_CAPBSET_READ:
|
|
if (!cap_valid(arg2))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
return !!cap_raised(old->cap_bset, arg2);
|
|
|
|
case PR_CAPBSET_DROP:
|
|
return cap_prctl_drop(arg2);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a
|
|
* system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem
|
|
* capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem
|
|
* capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note:
|
|
*
|
|
* PR_SET_SECUREBITS =
|
|
* issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)
|
|
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT)
|
|
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED)
|
|
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)
|
|
* | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED)
|
|
*
|
|
* will ensure that the current process and all of its
|
|
* children will be locked into a pure
|
|
* capability-based-privilege environment.
|
|
*/
|
|
case PR_SET_SECUREBITS:
|
|
if ((((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1)
|
|
& (old->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|
|
|| ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|
|
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
|
|
|| (cap_capable(current_cred(),
|
|
current_cred()->user_ns,
|
|
CAP_SETPCAP,
|
|
CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) /*[4]*/
|
|
/*
|
|
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
|
|
* [2] no unlocking of locks
|
|
* [3] no setting of unsupported bits
|
|
* [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about
|
|
* the "sendmail capabilities bug")
|
|
*/
|
|
)
|
|
/* cannot change a locked bit */
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
new->securebits = arg2;
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_SECUREBITS:
|
|
return old->securebits;
|
|
|
|
case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS:
|
|
return !!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
|
|
|
|
case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS:
|
|
if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (arg2)
|
|
new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
|
|
else
|
|
new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
|
|
case PR_CAP_AMBIENT:
|
|
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL) {
|
|
if (arg3 | arg4 | arg5)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (((!cap_valid(arg3)) | arg4 | arg5))
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET) {
|
|
return !!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_ambient, arg3);
|
|
} else if (arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
|
|
arg2 != PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER) {
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE &&
|
|
(!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_permitted, arg3) ||
|
|
!cap_raised(current_cred()->cap_inheritable,
|
|
arg3) ||
|
|
issecure(SECURE_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)))
|
|
return -EPERM;
|
|
|
|
new = prepare_creds();
|
|
if (!new)
|
|
return -ENOMEM;
|
|
if (arg2 == PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)
|
|
cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);
|
|
else
|
|
cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3);
|
|
return commit_creds(new);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
/* No functionality available - continue with default */
|
|
return -ENOSYS;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
|
|
* @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
|
|
* @pages: The size of the mapping
|
|
*
|
|
* Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current
|
|
* task is permitted, returning 1 if permission is granted, 0 if not.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
|
|
{
|
|
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns,
|
|
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) == 0)
|
|
cap_sys_admin = 1;
|
|
|
|
return cap_sys_admin;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
|
|
* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
|
|
*
|
|
* If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
|
|
* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
|
|
* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
|
|
* -EPERM if not.
|
|
*/
|
|
int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
|
|
ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
|
|
CAP_OPT_NONE);
|
|
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
|
|
if (ret == 0)
|
|
current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
|
|
}
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
|
|
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
|
|
{
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
|
|
|
|
struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, cap_capable),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, cap_ptrace_access_check),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, cap_bprm_set_creds),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_prctl, cap_task_prctl),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, cap_task_setscheduler),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, cap_task_setioprio),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, cap_task_setnice),
|
|
LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
void __init capability_add_hooks(void)
|
|
{
|
|
security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks),
|
|
"capability");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
|