The security hooks to check permissions to remove an xfrm_policy were
actually done after the policy was removed. Since the unlinking and
deletion are done in xfrm_policy_by* functions this moves the hooks
inside those 2 functions. There we have all the information needed to
do the security check and it can be done before the deletion. Since
auditing requires the result of that security check err has to be passed
back and forth from the xfrm_policy_by* functions.
This patch also fixes a bug where a deletion that failed the security
check could cause improper accounting on the xfrm_policy
(xfrm_get_policy didn't have a put on the exit path for the hold taken
by xfrm_policy_by*)
It also fixes the return code when no policy is found in
xfrm_add_pol_expire. In old code (at least back in the 2.6.18 days) err
wasn't used before the return when no policy is found and so the
initialization would cause err to be ENOENT. But since err has since
been used above when we don't get a policy back from the xfrm_policy_by*
function we would always return 0 instead of the intended ENOENT. Also
fixed some white space damage in the same area.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix the address family to refer encap_family
when comparing with a kernel generated xfrm_state
Signed-off-by: Kazunori MIYAZAWA <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make sure that this function is called correctly, and
add BUG() checking to ensure the arguments are sane.
Based upon a patch by Joy Latten.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Extend the XFRM framework so that endpoint address(es) in the XFRM
databases could be dynamically updated according to a request (MIGRATE
message) from user application. Target XFRM policy is first identified
by the selector in the MIGRATE message. Next, the endpoint addresses
of the matching templates and XFRM states are updated according to
the MIGRATE message.
Signed-off-by: Shinta Sugimoto <shinta.sugimoto@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The recent hashing introduced an off-by-one bug in policy list insertion.
Instead of adding after the last entry with a lesser or equal priority,
we're adding after the successor of that entry.
This patch fixes this and also adds a warning if we detect a duplicate
entry in the policy list. This should never happen due to this if clause.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Replace all uses of kmem_cache_t with struct kmem_cache.
The patch was generated using the following script:
#!/bin/sh
#
# Replace one string by another in all the kernel sources.
#
set -e
for file in `find * -name "*.c" -o -name "*.h"|xargs grep -l $1`; do
quilt add $file
sed -e "1,\$s/$1/$2/g" $file >/tmp/$$
mv /tmp/$$ $file
quilt refresh
done
The script was run like this
sh replace kmem_cache_t "struct kmem_cache"
Signed-off-by: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Disables auditing in ipsec when CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is
disabled in the kernel.
Also includes a bug fix for xfrm_state.c as a result of
original ipsec audit patch.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
An audit message occurs when an ipsec SA
or ipsec policy is created/deleted.
Signed-off-by: Joy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This change optimizes the dumping of Security policies.
1) Before this change ..
speedopolis:~# time ./ip xf pol
real 0m22.274s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m22.269s
2) Turn off sub-policies
speedopolis:~# ./ip xf pol
real 0m13.496s
user 0m0.000s
sys 0m13.493s
i suppose the above is to be expected
3) With this change ..
speedopolis:~# time ./ip x policy
real 0m7.901s
user 0m0.008s
sys 0m7.896s
Conflicts:
drivers/infiniband/core/iwcm.c
drivers/net/chelsio/cxgb2.c
drivers/net/wireless/bcm43xx/bcm43xx_main.c
drivers/net/wireless/prism54/islpci_eth.c
drivers/usb/core/hub.h
drivers/usb/input/hid-core.c
net/core/netpoll.c
Fix up merge failures with Linus's head and fix new compilation failures.
Signed-Off-By: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miika Komu <miika@iki.fi>
Signed-off-by: Diego Beltrami <Diego.Beltrami@hiit.fi>
Signed-off-by: Kazunori Miyazawa <miyazawa@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix the selection of an SA for an outgoing packet to be at the same
context as the originating socket/flow. This eliminates the SELinux
policy's ability to use/sendto SAs with contexts other than the socket's.
With this patch applied, the SELinux policy will require one or more of the
following for a socket to be able to communicate with/without SAs:
1. To enable a socket to communicate without using labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }
2. To enable a socket to communicate with labeled-IPSec SAs:
allow socket_t self:association { sendto };
allow socket_t peer_sa_t:association { recvfrom };
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This treats the security errors encountered in the case of
socket policy matching, the same as how these are treated in
the case of main/sub policies, which is to return a full lookup
failure.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently when an IPSec policy rule doesn't specify a security
context, it is assumed to be "unlabeled" by SELinux, and so
the IPSec policy rule fails to match to a flow that it would
otherwise match to, unless one has explicitly added an SELinux
policy rule allowing the flow to "polmatch" to the "unlabeled"
IPSec policy rules. In the absence of such an explicitly added
SELinux policy rule, the IPSec policy rule fails to match and
so the packet(s) flow in clear text without the otherwise applicable
xfrm(s) applied.
The above SELinux behavior violates the SELinux security notion of
"deny by default" which should actually translate to "encrypt by
default" in the above case.
This was first reported by Evgeniy Polyakov and the way James Morris
was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
With this patch applied, SELinux "polmatching" of flows Vs. IPSec
policy rules will only come into play when there's a explicit context
specified for the IPSec policy rule (which also means there's corresponding
SELinux policy allowing appropriate domains/flows to polmatch to this context).
Secondly, when a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return errors other than access denied,
such as -EINVAL. We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The solution for this is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
This patch: Fix the selinux side of things.
This makes sure SELinux polmatching of flow contexts to IPSec policy
rules comes into play only when an explicit context is associated
with the IPSec policy rule.
Also, this no longer defaults the context of a socket policy to
the context of the socket since the "no explicit context" case
is now handled properly.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When a security module is loaded (in this case, SELinux), the
security_xfrm_policy_lookup() hook can return an access denied permission
(or other error). We were not handling that correctly, and in fact
inverting the return logic and propagating a false "ok" back up to
xfrm_lookup(), which then allowed packets to pass as if they were not
associated with an xfrm policy.
The way I was seeing the problem was when connecting via IPsec to a
confined service on an SELinux box (vsftpd), which did not have the
appropriate SELinux policy permissions to send packets via IPsec.
The first SYNACK would be blocked, because of an uncached lookup via
flow_cache_lookup(), which would fail to resolve an xfrm policy because
the SELinux policy is checked at that point via the resolver.
However, retransmitted SYNACKs would then find a cached flow entry when
calling into flow_cache_lookup() with a null xfrm policy, which is
interpreted by xfrm_lookup() as the packet not having any associated
policy and similarly to the first case, allowing it to pass without
transformation.
The solution presented here is to first ensure that errno values are
correctly propagated all the way back up through the various call chains
from security_xfrm_policy_lookup(), and handled correctly.
Then, flow_cache_lookup() is modified, so that if the policy resolver
fails (typically a permission denied via the security module), the flow
cache entry is killed rather than having a null policy assigned (which
indicates that the packet can pass freely). This also forces any future
lookups for the same flow to consult the security module (e.g. SELinux)
for current security policy (rather than, say, caching the error on the
flow cache entry).
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When we flush policies, we do a type match so we might not
actually delete all policies matching a certain direction.
So keep track of how many policies we actually kill and
subtract that number from xfrm_policy_count[dir] at the
end.
Based upon a patch by Masahide NAKAMURA.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Hashing SAs by source address breaks templates with wildcards as tunnel
source since the source address used for hashing/lookup is still 0/0.
Move source address lookup to xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one() so we can use the
real address in the lookup.
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It seems that during the MIPv6 respin, some code which was originally
conditionally compiled around CONFIG_XFRM_ADVANCED was accidently left
in after the config option was removed.
This patch removes an extraneous pointer (xerr_idxp) which is no
longer needed.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Even if we find an exact match in the hash table,
we must inspect the inexact list to look for a match
with a better priority.
Noticed by Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This idea is from Alexey Kuznetsov.
It is common for policies to be non-prefixed. And for
that case we can optimize lookups, insert, etc. quite
a bit.
For each direction, we have a dynamically sized policy
hash table for non-prefixed policies. We also have a
hash table on policy->index.
For prefixed policies, we have a list per-direction which
we will consult on lookups when a non-prefix hashtable
lookup fails.
This still isn't as efficient as I would like it. There
are four immediate problems:
1) Lots of excessive refcounting, which can be fixed just
like xfrm_state was
2) We do 2 hash probes on insert, one to look for dups and
one to allocate a unique policy->index. Althought I wonder
how much this matters since xfrm_state inserts do up to
3 hash probes and that seems to perform fine.
3) xfrm_policy_insert() is very complex because of the priority
ordering and entry replacement logic.
4) Lots of counter bumping, in addition to policy refcounts,
in the form of xfrm_policy_count[]. This is merely used
to let code path(s) know that some IPSEC rules exist. So
this count is indexed per-direction, maybe that is overkill.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Just let GC and other normal mechanisms take care of getting
rid of DST cache references to deleted xfrm_state objects
instead of walking all the policy bundles.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Instead, simply set all potentially aliasing existing xfrm_state
objects to have the current generation counter value.
This will make routes get relooked up the next time an existing
route mentioning these aliased xfrm_state objects gets used,
via xfrm_dst_check().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Each xfrm_state inserted gets a new generation counter
value. When a bundle is created, the xfrm_dst objects
get the current generation counter of the xfrm_state
they will attach to at dst->xfrm.
xfrm_bundle_ok() will return false if it sees an
xfrm_dst with a generation count different from the
generation count of the xfrm_state that dst points to.
This provides a facility by which to passively and
cheaply invalidate cached IPSEC routes during SA
database changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Under two transformation policies it is required to merge them.
This is a platform to sort state for outbound and templates
for inbound respectively.
It will be used when Mobile IPv6 and IPsec are used at the same time.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Sub policy is introduced. Main and sub policy are applied the same flow.
(Policy that current kernel uses is named as main.)
It is required another transformation policy management to keep IPsec
and Mobile IPv6 lives separate.
Policy which lives shorter time in kernel should be a sub i.e. normally
main is for IPsec and sub is for Mobile IPv6.
(Such usage as two IPsec policies on different database can be used, too.)
Limitation or TODOs:
- Sub policy is not supported for per socket one (it is always inserted as main).
- Current kernel makes cached outbound with flowi to skip searching database.
However this patch makes it disabled only when "two policies are used and
the first matched one is bypass case" because neither flowi nor bundle
information knows about transformation template size.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
For Mobile IPv6 usage, it is required to trace which secpath state is
reject factor in order to notify it to user space (to know the address
which cannot be used route optimized communication).
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
This patch was also written by: Henrik Petander <petander@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For outbound transformation, bundle is checked whether it is
suitable for current flow to be reused or not. In such IPv6 case
as below, transformation may apply incorrect bundle for the flow instead
of creating another bundle:
- The policy selector has destination prefix length < 128
(Two or more addresses can be matched it)
- Its bundle holds dst entry of default route whose prefix length < 128
(Previous traffic was used such route as next hop)
- The policy and the bundle were used a transport mode state and
this time flow address is not matched the bundled state.
This issue is found by Mobile IPv6 usage to protect mobility signaling
by IPsec, but it is not a Mobile IPv6 specific.
This patch adds strict check to xfrm_bundle_ok() for each
state mode and address when prefix length is less than 128.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On current kernel inbound transformation state is allowed transport and
disallowed tunnel mode when mismatch is occurred between tempates and states.
As the result of adding two more modes by Mobile IPv6, this function name
is misleading. Inbound transformation can allow only transport mode
when mismatch is occurred between template and secpath.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For Mobile IPv6 usage, routing header or destination options header is
used and it doesn't require this comparison. It is checked only for
IPsec template.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Transformation mode is used as either IPsec transport or tunnel.
It is required to add two more items, route optimization and inbound trigger
for Mobile IPv6.
Based on MIPL2 kernel patch.
This patch was also written by: Ville Nuorvala <vnuorval@tcs.hut.fi>
Signed-off-by: Masahide NAKAMURA <nakam@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This labels the flows that could utilize IPSec xfrms at the points the
flows are defined so that IPSec policy and SAs at the right label can
be used.
The following protos are currently not handled, but they should
continue to be able to use single-labeled IPSec like they currently
do.
ipmr
ip_gre
ipip
igmp
sit
sctp
ip6_tunnel (IPv6 over IPv6 tunnel device)
decnet
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This implements a seemless mechanism for xfrm policy selection and
state matching based on the flow sid. This also includes the necessary
SELinux enforcement pieces.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If dst->obsolete is -1, this is a signal from the
bundle creator that we want the XFRM dst and the
dsts that it references to be validated on every
use.
I misunderstood this intention when I changed
xfrm_dst_check() to always return NULL.
Now, when we purge a dst entry, by running dst_free()
on it. This will set the dst->obsolete to a positive
integer, and we want to return NULL in that case so
that the socket does a relookup for the route.
Thus, if dst->obsolete<0, let stale_bundle() validate
the state, else always return NULL.
In general, we need to do things more intelligently
here because we flush too much state during rule
changes. Herbert Xu has some ideas wherein the key
manager gives us some help in this area. We can also
use smarter state management algorithms inside of
the kernel as well.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds the structure xfrm_mode. It is meant to represent
the operations carried out by transport/tunnel modes.
By doing this we allow additional encapsulation modes to be added
without clogging up the xfrm_input/xfrm_output paths.
Candidate modes include 4-to-6 tunnel mode, 6-to-4 tunnel mode, and
BEET modes.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The number of locks used to manage afinfo structures can easily be reduced
down to one each for policy and state respectively. This is based on the
observation that the write locks are only held by module insertion/removal
which are very rare events so there is no need to further differentiate
between the insertion of modules like ipv6 versus esp6.
The removal of the read locks in xfrm4_policy.c/xfrm6_policy.c might look
suspicious at first. However, after you realise that nobody ever takes
the corresponding write lock you'll feel better :)
As far as I can gather it's an attempt to guard against the removal of
the corresponding modules. Since neither module can be unloaded at all
we can leave it to whoever fixes up IPv6 unloading :)
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock can be taken in bh context, at:
[<c013fe1a>] lockdep_acquire_read+0x54/0x6d
[<c0f6e024>] _read_lock+0x15/0x22
[<c0e8fcdb>] xfrm_policy_get_afinfo+0x1a/0x3d
[<c0e8fd10>] xfrm_decode_session+0x12/0x32
[<c0e66094>] ip_route_me_harder+0x1c9/0x25b
[<c0e770d3>] ip_nat_local_fn+0x94/0xad
[<c0e2bbc8>] nf_iterate+0x2e/0x7a
[<c0e2bc50>] nf_hook_slow+0x3c/0x9e
[<c0e3a342>] ip_push_pending_frames+0x2de/0x3a7
[<c0e53e19>] icmp_push_reply+0x136/0x141
[<c0e543fb>] icmp_reply+0x118/0x1a0
[<c0e54581>] icmp_echo+0x44/0x46
[<c0e53fad>] icmp_rcv+0x111/0x138
[<c0e36764>] ip_local_deliver+0x150/0x1f9
[<c0e36be2>] ip_rcv+0x3d5/0x413
[<c0df760f>] netif_receive_skb+0x337/0x356
[<c0df76c3>] process_backlog+0x95/0x110
[<c0df5fe2>] net_rx_action+0xa5/0x16d
[<c012d8a7>] __do_softirq+0x6f/0xe6
[<c0105ec2>] do_softirq+0x52/0xb1
this means that all write-locking of xfrm_policy_afinfo_lock must be
bh-safe. This patch fixes xfrm_policy_register_afinfo() and
xfrm_policy_unregister_afinfo().
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
xfrm typemap->lock may be used in softirq context, so all write_lock()
uses must be softirq-safe.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch removes the *_decap_state structures which were previously
used to share state between input/post_input. This is no longer
needed.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Semaphore to mutex conversion.
The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated
automatically via a script as well.
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This is similar to the SA expire insertion patch - only it inserts
expires for SP.
Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
