x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameter

commit 7fbf47c7ce50b38a64576b150e7011ae73d54669 upstream.

Add the "retbleed=<value>" boot parameter to select a mitigation for
RETBleed. Possible values are "off", "auto" and "unret"
(JMP2RET mitigation). The default value is "auto".

Currently, "retbleed=auto" will select the unret mitigation on
AMD and Hygon and no mitigation on Intel (JMP2RET is not effective on
Intel).

  [peterz: rebase; add hygon]
  [jpoimboe: cleanups]

Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
[cascardo: this effectively remove the UNRET mitigation as an option, so it
 has to be complemented by a later pick of the same commit later. This is
 done in order to pick retbleed_select_mitigation]
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Alexandre Chartre 2022-11-17 18:19:28 +09:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent bd2b18f6d2
commit c79ea34ffb
2 changed files with 85 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -4132,6 +4132,18 @@
retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction retain_initrd [RAM] Keep initrd memory after extraction
retbleed= [X86] Control mitigation of RETBleed (Arbitrary
Speculative Code Execution with Return Instructions)
vulnerability.
off - unconditionally disable
auto - automatically select a migitation
Selecting 'auto' will choose a mitigation method at run
time according to the CPU.
Not specifying this option is equivalent to retbleed=auto.
rfkill.default_state= rfkill.default_state=
0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm, 0 "airplane mode". All wifi, bluetooth, wimax, gps, fm,
etc. communication is blocked by default. etc. communication is blocked by default.

View File

@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "cpu.h" #include "cpu.h"
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void); static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void); static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void); static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
@ -111,6 +112,12 @@ void __init check_bugs(void)
/* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v1_select_mitigation();
retbleed_select_mitigation();
/*
* spectre_v2_select_mitigation() relies on the state set by
* retbleed_select_mitigation(); specifically the STIBP selection is
* forced for UNRET.
*/
spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation();
ssb_select_mitigation(); ssb_select_mitigation();
l1tf_select_mitigation(); l1tf_select_mitigation();
@ -705,6 +712,71 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
} }
early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline); early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
#undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
enum retbleed_mitigation {
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
};
enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
RETBLEED_CMD_OFF,
RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO,
};
const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable",
};
static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
static int __init retbleed_parse_cmdline(char *str)
{
if (!str)
return -EINVAL;
if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
else if (!strcmp(str, "auto"))
retbleed_cmd = RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
else
pr_err("Unknown retbleed option (%s). Defaulting to 'auto'\n", str);
return 0;
}
early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
#define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
#define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
{
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) || cpu_mitigations_off())
return;
switch (retbleed_cmd) {
case RETBLEED_CMD_OFF:
return;
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
default:
if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED))
break;
break;
}
switch (retbleed_mitigation) {
default:
break;
}
pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
}
#undef pr_fmt #undef pr_fmt
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt #define pr_fmt(fmt) "Spectre V2 : " fmt
@ -1901,7 +1973,7 @@ static ssize_t srbds_show_state(char *buf)
static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf) static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
{ {
return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
} }
static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,