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x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRS

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commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 upstream.

Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS.

  [jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS]

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Pawan Gupta 2022-11-17 18:19:33 +09:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent f1b4cf5ce4
commit c1493b60fd
3 changed files with 54 additions and 14 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

1
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
View File

@ -4389,6 +4389,7 @@
eibrs - enhanced IBRS
eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines
eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE
ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.

1
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
View File

@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
SPECTRE_V2_IBRS,
};
/* The indirect branch speculation control variants */

66
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
View File

@ -877,6 +877,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
};
enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@ -949,11 +950,12 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
}
static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
{
return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
}
static void __init
@ -1018,12 +1020,12 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
}
/*
* If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled or SMT impossible, STIBP is not
* required.
* If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible,
* STIBP is not required.
*/
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
!smt_possible ||
spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return;
/*
@ -1048,6 +1050,7 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS",
};
static const struct {
@ -1065,6 +1068,7 @@ static const struct {
{ "eibrs,lfence", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE, false },
{ "eibrs,retpoline", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE, false },
{ "auto", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO, false },
{ "ibrs", SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS, false },
};
static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
@ -1127,6 +1131,24 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
pr_err("%s selected but not Intel CPU. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) {
pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) {
pr_err("%s selected but running as XenPV guest. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
spec_v2_print_cond(mitigation_options[i].option,
mitigation_options[i].secure);
return cmd;
@ -1166,6 +1188,14 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
break;
}
if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) &&
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
break;
}
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
@ -1182,6 +1212,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
break;
@ -1198,7 +1232,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
if (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS && unprivileged_ebpf_enabled())
pr_err(SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG);
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
write_spec_ctrl_current(x86_spec_ctrl_base, true);
@ -1209,6 +1243,10 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS);
break;
case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
@ -1235,17 +1273,17 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB mitigation: Filling RSB on context switch\n");
/*
* Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect
* branches. Enhanced IBRS protects firmware too, so, enable restricted
* speculation around firmware calls only when Enhanced IBRS isn't
* supported.
* Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS
* and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around
* firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise
* enabled.
*
* Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because
* the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
* the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
* enable IBRS around firmware calls.
*/
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(mode)) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
}
@ -1939,7 +1977,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
static char *stibp_state(void)
{
if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
return "";
switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {