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Bluetooth: refactor malicious adv data check

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commit 899663be5e75dc0174dc8bda0b5e6826edf0b29a upstream.

Check for out-of-bound read was being performed at the end of while
num_reports loop, and would fill journal with false positives. Added
check to beginning of loop processing so that it doesn't get checked
after ptr has been advanced.

Signed-off-by: Brian Gix <brian.gix@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: syphyr <syphyr@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
This commit is contained in:
Brian Gix 2021-11-24 12:16:28 -08:00 committed by Greg Kroah-Hartman
parent f4b1bd6d9c
commit 8819f93cd4
1 changed files with 5 additions and 5 deletions
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10
net/bluetooth/hci_event.c
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@ -5391,6 +5391,11 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct hci_ev_le_advertising_info *ev = ptr;
s8 rssi;
if (ptr > (void *)skb_tail_pointer(skb) - sizeof(*ev)) {
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Malicious advertising data.");
break;
}
if (ev->length <= HCI_MAX_AD_LENGTH &&
ev->data + ev->length <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) {
rssi = ev->data[ev->length];
@ -5402,11 +5407,6 @@ static void hci_le_adv_report_evt(struct hci_dev *hdev, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
ptr += sizeof(*ev) + ev->length + 1;
if (ptr > (void *) skb_tail_pointer(skb) - sizeof(*ev)) {
bt_dev_err(hdev, "Malicious advertising data. Stopping processing");
break;
}
}
hci_dev_unlock(hdev);